ATMANIRBHARTA IN INDIA’S DEFENCE POLICY: HOW VIABLE IS IT?

Despite numerous attempts to equalise the playing field, India’s military-industrial complex has remained firmly anchored with the Department of Defence Production, with the private sector having been seen as suppliers rather than partners.

Despite suggestions and a roadmap by the Kalam Committee in 1993 to enhance India’s Self Reliance Index to 70% by 2005, with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) having the monopoly on design and development, India’s Self Reliance Index has remained stuck at 30% of the total imports.

In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Atmanirbhar (self-reliance) programme has given indigenous defence players in the country a new light of hope. The Finance Minister altered the regulations of importation in the General Financial Rules previously, reserving all commodities up to Rs 200 crores for domestic production.

Moreover, 68% of the capital procurement budget had been reserved for the domestic industry by the Defence Ministry for FY23. Moreover, 25% of the Domestic Procurement/Acquisition Budget was reserved for the domestic private sector for the same period.

Through a special purpose vehicle (SPV), the private sector will be involved in the design and production of military platforms and equipment. There will also be the establishment of an independent nodal umbrella agency for certification requirements.

However, examining the practicality of the new policies, we can see a push to manufacture defence equipment under the ‘Make in India’ scheme, and to improve design and development capability has been impeded by inadequate design capability in weapons, sensors, and propulsion systems. The DRDO has not been able to produce credible indigenous alternatives to imported carbon fibres, Active Electronically Scanned Radars or Stealth capabilities.

GE Aviation provides the engine that propels Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The same is true for the manufacture of main battle tanks (MBTs). In light of these considerations, it was decided to collaborate with well-known international design firms to improve military equipment. MR SAM (surface-to-air missile), a pinnacle of collaboration with Israel, has been one such outcome of a successful engagement. India also entered into a joint venture with a Russian company to produce the BrahMos cruise missiles, and signed a deal with Russia to build a fifth-generation stealth aircraft.

In terms of defence manufacturing, Atmanirbharta is a good policy. Allowing commercial companies and universities to work with the DRDO is an excellent concept. India’s R&D budget is a pitiful 0.7% of GDP, compared to most developing countries’ 3%. The financial provision made for DRDO in the fiscal year is just 6% of the total defence expenditure (Rs 9,674 crore). It is significantly less than the 10% suggested by a Parliamentary Standing Committee.

The Finance Ministry does not fully realise that without global collaboration, the private sector and the research field would be unable to design major platforms and weapon systems. Instead of just changing procurement policies and allocating funds to the industry and the research sector from DRDO’s budgetary allocation, joint ventures and R&D should also become templates for defence manufacturing.

10 May 2022
Prishita Das